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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The question of whether the "right of publicity" is recognizable, as
such, has yet to be presented in North Carolina. In Flake v. Greensboro
News Co.,24 however, a recognition of the right of privacy provided
indirect protection to one's commercial interest in his name and photo-
graph. Certain language in the Flake case in labeling rights in a per-
son's photograph as a "property" right; in referring to the value in one's
features as exclusively his until granted away; and in recognizing that
modern advertising techniques consider the name or photograph of some
people a valuable asset, indicates that a decision, if and when rendered,
would be substantially in accord with the principal case. It is submitted
that an action in privacy is inadequate protection to commercial interests
in personality; and, in agreement with the Haelan case, the value of this
commercial interest will be greatly diminished if, as an incident to a
purchase, a legally protectible interest is not transferred as the "right of
publicity."*
JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM
Torts-Charitable Institutions-Liability to Paying Patients
In two recent cases' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
charitable hospital was not liable in damages to a paying patient for
injuries caused by the negligence of employees of the hospital on the
grounds that (1) The doctrine that a charitable institution may not be
held liable to a beneficiary of a charity for the negligence of its servants
or employees if it has exercised due care in their selection and retention
is settled law in this jurisdiction and should not be lightly overruled or
whittled away by the court and (2) On the basis of authority and rea-
soning, no exception should be made in the rule of immunity in favor
of paying patrons of charitable institutions.
Justice Barnhill dissented saying that when a hospital charges and
receives pay for services rendered a patient, it assumes an obligation to
denied, 315 U. S. 823 (1942) ; Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162
P. 2d 133 (1945) ; Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 107 N. E. 2d 485(1952). For illustration of the reasonableness of such recovery see Holmes, quot-
ing Readers Digest, Dec., 1941, p. 23 in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F. 2d 167,
171 n. 6 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1941) (dissenting opinion), "Illustrative of the value
of the use of one's picture for advertising purposes, Gene Tunney says: 'While I
was training for my second fight with Jack Dempsey I was offered $15,000 to
endorse a certain brand of cigarettes. I didn't want to be rude, so, in declining, I
merely said I didn't smoke. Next day the advertising man came back with another
offer: $12,000 if I would let my picture be used with the statement that "Stinkies
must be good, because all my friends smoke them."' (This offer also was refused.)."
24212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the principal case. 74 Sup. Ct. 26
(1953).
' Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953);
Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, 237 N. C. 395, 75 S. E. 2d 308 (1953)
(The case was first before the Supreme Court in 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662
(1951)).
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exercise due care and should be subjected to the same responsibility that
is imposed on others.
The decisions on this question have been in almost hopeless conflict.
The paying patient has recovered against the hospital for negligence of
physicians, 2 nurses,3 and employees, 4 and for administrative negligence,
such as negligence of the superintendent, 5 failure to provide safe equip-
ment,6 or failure to select competent nurses and employees. In other
cases he has been denied recovery against the hospital not only for negli-
gence of physicians, 8 nurses,9 and employees,10 but also for administra-
2 Moeller v. Hauser, 54 N. W. 2d 639 (Minn. 1952).
' Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; England v.
Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 14 Cal. 2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813 (1940); Silva v.
Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1940) ; Durney v. St. Francis
Hospital, Inc., 83 A. 2d 753 (Del. 1951) ; Suwannee County Hospital Corp. v. Gol-
den, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952) ; Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360,
199. So. 344 (1940) ; Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933) ; Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151 (1950) ; Borwege v.
City of Owatonna, 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915 (1933) ; Sisters of the Sorrowful
Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (1938) ; City of Pawhuska v. Black,
117 Okla. 108, 244 Pac. 1114 (1926) ; City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223
Pac. 354 (1924) ; Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 94 Utah 460,
78 P. 2d 645 (1938) ; Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass'n, 32 Utah
46, 88 Pac. 691 (1907) ; Pierce v. Yakima Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 260 P. 2d 765
(Wash. 1953).
'O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835
(1939) (limited to nontrust funds); Robertson v. Executive Comm. of Baptist
Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937) (limited to funds from paying
patients) ; Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918) (limited
to funds from paying patients) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss.
906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951), aff'd, 56 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 1952) ; Volk v. City of New
York, 284 N. Y. 279, 30 N. E. 2d 596 (1940) ; Sheehan v. North Country Com-
munity Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. 2d 28 (1937) ; City of Okmulgee v. Carl-
ton, 180 Okla. 605, 71 P. 2d 722 (1937) ; Galvin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I.
411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879) (rule changed by statute in 1896) ; Vanderbilt Uni-
versity v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938) (limited to
liability insurance).
'Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940).
o St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952) (limited
to nontrust funds) ; Fields v. Mountainside Hospital, 22 N. J. Misc. 72, 35 A. 2d
701 (Cir. Ct. 1944) ; Gordon v. Harbor Hospital, 275 App. Div. 1047, 92 N. Y. S.
2d 101 (1949); Texas Medical & Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229
S. W. 2d 932 (Tex. 1949) ; Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wash. 2d 204, 105
P. 2d 32 (1940).
7 Georgia Baptist Hospital v. Smith, 37 Ga. App. 92, 139 S. E. 101 (1927);
Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914) ; Taylor v. Flower Deaconess
Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 287 (1922) ; St. Paul's Sanitarium
v. Williamson, 164 S. W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) ; Norfolk Protestant Hospital
v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173 S. E. 363 (1934) ; Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619,
89 P. 2d 807 (1939) ; Tribble v. Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 137 Wash.
326, 242 Pac. 372 (1926).
8 Union Pacific Ry. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Hearns v. Water-
bury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895) ; Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y.
Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470,
135 Pac. 235 (1913) ; Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 10 Wash. 648, 39 Pac.
95 (1895). Most cases hold that the hospital is not liable because the physician is
not a servant of the hospital but more in the nature of an independent contractor.
' Deming Ladies' Hospital Ass'n v. Price, 276 Fed. 668 (8th Cir. 1921) ; Pater-
lini v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 247 Fed. 639 (3rd Cir. 1918) ; Powers v. Mass.
Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal.
(Vol. 32
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tive negligence. 1
Some courts have allowed12 or denied 13 recovery to a patient without
App. 2d 656, 62 P. 2d 1075 (1936) ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429,
47 P. 2d 740 (1935) ; Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 Pac.
1008 (1918); Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895);
Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849
(1938) ; Hogan v. Chicago-Lying-In Hospital, 335 Ill. 42, 166 N. E. 461 (1929) ;
St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Cook v. John
N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874 (1918); Adams v.
University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); Sibilia v. Paxton
Memorial Hospital, 121 Neb. 860, 238 N. W. 751 (1931); Duncan v. Neb. Sani-
tarium Benevolent Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912) ; D'Amato v. Orange
Memorial Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 AtI. 340 (1925) ; Taylor v. Protestant
Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911) ; Gregory v. Salem General
Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227
Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910) ; Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E.
512 (1914); Enell v. Baptist Hospital, 45 S. W. 2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ;
Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 387, 107 S. E. 785(1921); Weiss v. Swedish Hospital, 16 Wash. 2d 446, 133 P. 2d 978 (1943);
Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 169 Pac. 828 (1918) ; Roberts v.
Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (1925) ; Morrison v.
Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N. W. 173 (1916); Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley,
24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916). Nurses, except the patient's private nurse, are
usually considered hospital employees but a few courts consider them independent
contractors or employees of the physician or of the patient. Jordan v. Touro In-
firmary, 11 La. App. 423, 123 So. 726 (1922) (nurse in operating room) ; Wallstedt
v. Swedish Hospital, 220 Minn. 274, 19 N. W. 2d 426 (1945) (nurse in operating
room); Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924)
(orderly).
" Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46
P. 2d 118 (1935), overruled by Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230
P. 2d 220 (1951) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. 2d
520 (1931); Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 344, 41 N. E. 2d
314 (1942); Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219 (1918),
overruled by Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d
151 (1950); Ratliffe v. Wesley Hospital and Nurses' Training School, 135 Kan.
307, 10 P. 2d 859 (1932) ; Nickolson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Hospital Ass'n, 97
Kan. 480, 155 Pac. 920 (1916); Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital,
191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d 574 (1948) ; Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261
Mich. 327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933) ; Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60
N. W. 42 (1894) ; Roberts v. Kirksville College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 16 S. W.
2d 625 (Mo. App. 1929); Nicholas v. Evangelical Deaconess Home & Hospital,
281 Mo. 182, 219 S. W. 643 (1920); Cunningham v. Sheltering Arms, 135 App. Div.
178, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (1909); Duncan v. St. Luke's Hospital, 113 App. Div.
68, 98 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1906), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 580, 85 N. E. 1109 (1908) ; Baylor
University v. Boyd, 18 S. W. 2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Meade v. St. Francis,
74 S. E. 2d 405 (W. Va. 1953) ; Fisher v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Ass'n, 73
S. E. 2d 667 (W. Va. 1952); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. 2d 212
(1942) ; Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconness Soc., 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476
(1935).
" Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 247 Fed. 629 (3d Cir. 1918).
1 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951) (negligent
employee) ; Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175
N. W. 699 (1920) (negligent nurse) ; International Order of Twelve of Knights
and Daughters v. Barnes, 204 Miss. 333, 37 So. 2d 487 (1948) (negligent selec-
tion); Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939)(negligent employee) ; Holtfoth v. Rochester General Hospital, 304 N. Y. 27, 105
N. E. 2d 610 (1952) (faulty equipment); Santos v. Unity Hospital, 301 N. Y.
153, 93 N. E. 2d 574 (1950) (administrative negligence).
1 Negligent physicians: Erwin v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital, 323 Mich. 114,
34 N. W. 2d 480 (1948) ; Bruce v. Henry Ford Hospital, 254 Mich. 394, 236 N. W.
813 (1931) ; Van Tassell v. Manhattan Eye & Ear Hospital, 67 Sup. Ct. Rep., N. Y.
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any mention of whether he paid. Others have ruled that payment could
not change the nature of the institution 14 or the rule of liability.15  The
(60 Hun) 585, 15 N. Y. Supp. 620 (1891). Negligent nurses: Shane v. Hospital
of the Good Samaritan, 2 Cal. App. 2d 334, 37 P. 2d 1066 (1934) ; Cashman V.
Meriden Hospital, 117 Conn. 585, 169 At. 915 (1933) ; Davin v. Kansas Medical,
Missionary & Benevolent Ass'n, 103 Kan. 48, 172 Pac. 1002 (1918); Browder v.
City of Henderson, 182 Ky. 771, 207 S. W. 479 (1919) (immunity of both city
and charity) ; Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. 2d 139 (1945) ; Thibo-
daux v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 11 La. App. 423, 123 So. 466(1929) ; Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Ati. 898 (1910) ;
Joel v. Woman's Hospital, 96 Sup. Ct. Rep., N. Y. (89 Hun) 73, 35 N. Y. Supp.
37 (1895) ; Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N. E. 2d 857 (1936) ;
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S. W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951);
Steele v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 60 S. W. 2d 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Negli-
gent employees: Ritchie v. Long Beach Community Hospital Ass'n, 139 Cal. App.
688, 34 P. 2d 771 (1934) (not liable because charity and also no evidence of proxi-
mate cause); Levy v. Superior Court of Cal., 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100(1925); Brown v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 740 (1929)(not liable because only trust funds available) ; Evans v. Lawrence & Memorial
Associated Hospitals, 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d 443 (1946) ; Maretick v. South
Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N. E. 2d 1012 (1938); Kidd
v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N. E. 55 (1921) ; Robinson v.
Washtenow Circuit Judge, 228 Mich. 225, 199 N. W. 618 (1924) (immunity of
both state and charity) ; Woods v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n, 6 N. J. Super. 47, 69
A. 2d 742 (1949); Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N. E. 126(1927) ; Barnes v. Providence Sanitarium, 229 S. W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ;
Bise v. St. Luke's Hospital, 181 Wash. 269, 43 P. 2d 4 (1935). Administrative
negligence: Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 Atl. 761 (1938) (fraud) ;
Lenahen v. Ancilla Domini Sisters, 331 Ill. App. 27, 72 N. E. 2d 445 (1947) (neg-
ligent selection) ; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E.
392 (1920) (negligent selection) ; Pepke v. Grace Hospital, 130 Mich. 493, 90
N. W. 278 (1902) (negligent selection) ; Fair v. Atlantic City Hospital, 25 N. J.
Misc. 65, 50 A. 2d 376 (Cir. Ct. 1946) (faulty equipment); Walsh v. Sisters of
Charity of St. Vincent's Hospital, 47 Ohio App. 228, 191 N. E. 791 (1933) (faulty
equipment).
" Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Arm-
strong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P. 2d 740 (1935) ; Boardman v. Burlin-
game, 123 Conn. 646, 197 Atl. 761 (1938) ; Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary,
107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910) ; Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60
N. W. 42 (1894) ; Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512 (1914);
Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P. 2d 807 (1939).
" Hospital liable: Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220(1951) ; Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 83 A. 2d 753 (Del. 1951) ; Taylor
v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 287 (1922) ;
St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164 S. W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). Hos-
pital not liable: Deming Ladies' Hospital Ass'n, 276 Fed. 668 (8th Cir. 1921);
Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Southern
Methodist Hospital & Sanatorium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. 2d 118 (1935),
overruled by Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, supra as to liability but not as to
effect of payment; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. 2d520 (1931) ; Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 Pac. 1008 (1918) ;
St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Browder v. City
of Henderson, 182 Ky. 771, 207 S. W. 479 (1919) ; Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity
of the Incarnate Word, 11 La. App. 423, 123 So. 466 (1929); Howard v. South
Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d 574 (1948); Nicholas v. Evan-
gelical Deaconness Home & Hospital, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S. W. 643 (1920) ; Adams
v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); D'Amato v.
Orange Memorial Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 AtI. 340 (1925) ; Gable v. Sisters
of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910); Enell v. Baptist Hospital, 45
S. W. 2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S. W. 2d 700(Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399 169 Pac.
828 (1918) ; Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235 (1913) ; Roberts v.
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paying patient may not have recovered because he was a recipient of
charity,' his payment being merely a contribution to the charity rather
than payment for services, 17 or he may have recovered because he was
not a recipient of charity.' 8
Generally where the patient has sued for breach of contract, he has
not recovered on the ground that where there is no recovery in tort there
can be none in contract if the breach is essentially a tort.19 In other
states he has recovered on breach of contract.20  Because of negligent
service, a patient has been allowed to recover the money paid to the
hospital2 ' and, where sued by the hospital for the value of services ren-
dered, to set up the defense of negligent service.
22
In suits against company hospitals maintained by joint contributions
of employees and the employer, the employee-patient has been either
allowed recovery because the hospital is not a charity,23 or denied re-
covery because the hospital was a charity.2
4
Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (1925); Schau v.
Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. 2d 212 (1942).
1" Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Downs
v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894); Adams v. University
Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); Duncan v. Neb. Sanitarium
Benev. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912) ; D'Amato v. Orange Memorial
Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 Atl. 340 (1925); Cunningham v. Sheltering Arms,
135 App. Div. 178, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (1909) ; Sisters of The Sorrowful Mother
v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (1938); Weston's Adm's v. Hospital of
St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 (1921).
17 Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Downs
v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894); Adams v. University
Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907) ; D'Amato v. Orange Memorial
Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 A. 340 (1925); Mills v. Society of the New York
Hospital, 242 App. Div. 245, 274 N. Y. Supp. 233 (1934), aff'd 270 N. Y. 594, 1
N. E. 2d 346 (1936).
" Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1940) ; Suwannee
County Hospital Corp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952); Mississippi Baptist
Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951), aff'd, 56 So. 2d 709 (Miss.
1952).
" Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N. E. 2d 314
(1942) ; Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219 (1918) ; Cook
v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874 (1918) ; Roosen
v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392 (1920) ; Greatrex v.
Evangelical Deaconness Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933) ; Downs v.
Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894) ; Duncan v. Neb. Sanitarium
Benev. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912) ; Fields v. Mountainside Hos-
pital, 22 N. J. Misc. 72, 35 A. 2d 701 (Cir. Ct. 1944) ; Duncan v. St. Luke's Hos-
pital, 112 App. Div. 68, 98 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1906), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 580, 85 N. E.
1109 (1908) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910).
" Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; Parrish v.
Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933) ; Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hos-
pital Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938).
'Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912).
"2 Beverly Hospital v. Early, 292 Mass. 201, 197 N. E. 641 (1935) (But he
could not set up this defense by way of recoupment since a charitable hospital is not
liable in Mass.).
" Bowman v. Southern Pac. Co., 55 Cal. App. 734, 204 Pac. 403 (1922) ; Phil-
lips v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 211 Mo. 419, 111 S. W. 109 (1908) ; Texas & Pacific
Coal v. Connaughton, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 642, 50 S. W. 173 (1899); Sawdey v.
Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972 (1902).
"Union Pacific Ry. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Nickolson v. Atchi-
1953]
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Recovery by the paying patient has depended in part on whether he
knew at the time he entered the hospital that it was a charitable institu-
tion.2 5  It has depended on whether the hospital carried liability insur-
ance26 or whether it had other nontrust property.27  In most states the
existence of liability insurance has had no effect on either liability or
recovery.28
Although the weight of older authority is definitely on the side of
nonliability of charitable hospitals to patients for the negligence of hos-
pital employees, the trend is toward liability. Of the 30 states that have
passed on this precise question since 1930, 13 denied recovery, 29 12 al-
lowed unconditional recovhry,3° three allowed recovery limited to liability
insurance or funds from paying patients,"' and two under statutory pro-
son, T. & S. F. Hospital Ass'n, 97 Kan. 480, 155 Pac. 920 (1916) ; Barden v. At-
-lantic C. L. Ry., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910) ; Richardson v. Carbon Hill
Coal Co., 10 Wash. 648, 39 Pac. 95 (1895). Other cases hold such a hospital notliable on the ground that a railroad is not liable for negligence of physicians.
"England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 14 Cal. 2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813(1940).
2" St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952) ; O'Con-
nor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939) ;
Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938).
" Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918) (funds from
paying patients); Robertson v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention, 55 Ga.
App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937) (funds from paying patients).
See Notes, 19 N. C. L. Rv. 245 (1941) ; 25 A. L. R. 2d 29, 139 (1952).
2 Evans v. Lawrence & Memorial Associated Hospitals, 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d
443 (1946) ; Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82
P. 2d 849 (1938) ; Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. 2d 139 (1945) ;
Ratliffe v. Wesley Hospital & Nurses' Training School, 135 Kan. 307, 10 P. 2d
859 (1932) ; Erwin v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital, 323 Mich. 114, 34 N. W. 2d
480 (1948); Sibilia v. Paxton Memorial Hospital, 121 Neb. 860, 238 N. W. 751(1931) ; Woods v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n, 6 N. 3. Super. 47, 69 A. 2d 742 (1949) ;
Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953) ; Lake-
side Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N. E. 2d 857 (1936) ; Gregory v. Salem
General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944) ; Baptist Memorial Hospital
v. Marrable, 244 S. W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Meade v. St. Francis
Hospital, 74 S. E. 2d 405 (W. Va. 1953) ; Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W.
2d 212 (1942).
"0 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951) (expressly
overruling prior decisions) ; England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 14 Cal.
2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813 (1940) (overruling prior decisions) ; Durney v. St. Francis
Hospital, Inc., 83 A. 2d 753 (Del. 1951); Suwannee County Hospital Corp. v.
Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241
Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151 (1950) (expressly overruling prior decisions) ; Moeller
v. Hauser, 54 N. W. 2d 639 (Minn. 1952) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes,214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951), affd, 56 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 1952) (expressly
overruling prior decisions) ; Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N. H. 337,9 A. 2d 761 (1939); Pivar v. Manhattan General, Inc., 279 App. Div. 522, 110N. Y. S. 2d 786 (1952) ; City of Okmulgee v. Carlton, 180 Okla. 605, 71 P. 2d 722(1937) ; Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d
645 (1938) ; Pierce v. Yakima Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 260 P. 2d 765 (Wash.
1953) (expressly overruling prior decisions).
1 O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835(1939) (liability insurance) ; Robertson v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention,
55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937) (funds from paying patients) ; VanderbiltUniversity v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938) (liability
insurance).
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visions allowed suit directly against the insurance company although the
hospital if sued could have set up its immunity from tort liability.32 Only
three states within the last three years have denied recovery.33
The North Carolina Court has said repeatedly that a charitable hos-
pital is not liable to a beneficiary for negligence of its employees if care-
fully selected.34 In only the three cases following have the facts involved
a charitable institution, a beneficiary, and negligence of a carefully se-
lected employee.3 5
In Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway30 the defendant railway
operated a hospital for its employees and 'deducted small amounts monthly
from their wages to help defray the cost of hospital care. In a suit by a
patient, an employee of the railway, for injuries aused by the negligence
of employees of the hospital, the hospital was held a charity and by the
weight of authority in this country not liable for the negligence of its
agents.37
In Herndon v. Massey3 3 the plaintiff, who had paid a $1 fee to enroll
in a swimming class at the defendant YWCA, was injured by negligence
of its employees. A motion to strike an allegation that the defendant
charitable organization carried liability insurance was granted. In af-
firming, the Supreme Court said that North Carolina followed the ma-
jority rule that a charitable institution is not liable for negligence of
"Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 140 (W. D. Ark.
1950) ; Thomas v. Board of County Comm'rs of Prince George's County, 92 A. 2d
452 (Md. 1952).
" Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953);
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S. W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951);
Meade v. St. Francis Hospital, 74 S. E. 2d 405 (W. Va. 1953).
"Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662(1951) ; Smith v. Duke University 219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643 (1941) (hospital
not liable because negligent physician was not an agent, the court stating that it
was unnecessary to determine whether the hospital was charitable) ; Herndon v.
Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940) ; Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Hospitals,
197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672 (1929) (charitable hospital liable to employee for
negligence of another employee); Johnson v. City Hospital Co., 196 N. C. 610,
146 S. E. 573 (1929) (profit hospital not liable for negligence of physician who
was not an agent of the hospital) ; Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807
(1914) (charitable hospital liable to patient for negligence in selecting incompetent
employee) ; Green v. Biggs, 167 N. C. 417, 83 S. E. 553 (1914) (profit hospital
liable to patient for negligence of employee) ; Barden v. Atlantic Coast L. Ry., 152
N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
"Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662
(1951) (first time before the Court) ; Herndon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E.
2d 914 (1940) ; Barden v. Atlantic Coast L. Ry., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
"152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
'7 About half of the cases cited as authority were cases in which railroads had
employed physicians for treatment of employees and in which the question of lia-
bility of a charitable institution was not raised. Those cases cited which dealt with
the question of nonliability of charitable hospitals were based on McDonald v.
Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876) which in turn was based on an early
English case which had already been overruled. See Notes, 30 N. C. L. REv. 67,
n. 3 (1951) ; 25 A. L. R. 2d 29, 38 (1952).
" 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940).
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employees and held that insurance would not affect the question of
liability.
In Williams v. Union County Hospital39 the plaintiff, a paying patient
in defendant hospital, was injured by the negligence of employees of the
hospital. A demurrer to defendant's answer that it was a nonprofit
charitable corporation and therefore not liable was overruled. In affirm-
ing, the Court repeated the rule of nonliability to beneficiaries but said
that it had not been applied in this state against one who is not a re-
cipient of charity but who pays full compensation. 40
It was on the authority of these cases that the North Carolina Su-
preme Court in 1953 held that a charitable hospital was not liable to a
paying patient for negligence of hospital employees. 41
Nowhere in the North Carolina 'decisions is there a precise state-
ment of the reason, except authority, for the rule of nonliability to bene-
ficiaries. Although the Court in two cases discusses the reasons which
other courts have adopted,42 it does not indicate which, if any, it favors.
The Court has also talked about the policy of effectuating the purposes
for which charitable institutions are established 43 and about being just
before being generous.44
If these are the criteria, it is interesting to see how the Court has
applied them. An employee of a charitable hospital collected from the
hospital for negligence of a fellow employee. 45 A patient (whether pay
or nonpay is not mentioned) collected from the hospital for its failure
" 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662 (1951).
"At the subsequent trial a nonsuit was granted at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence. The decision upholding this is the decision in note 1 supra.
" See note 1 supra.
4" Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953);
Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914). The theories most generally used
to support immunity for charitable institutions are (1) trust fund, (2) nonapplica-
bility of respondeat superior, (3) implied waiver, and (4) public policy. See
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (D. C.
Cir. 1942). Also Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 22
A. B. A. J. 48 (1936); Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 191 (1928) ; Hansen, Damage Liability of Charitable Corporations, 19 MARQ.
L. REv. 92 (1935); Spencer, Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, A Re-Appraisal of the
Tort Liability of Charities, 24 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 71 (1951); Tulchinsky, Tort
Liability of Charitable Institutions, 13 NoTRE DA 1E LAw. 101 (1937) ; Zollman,
Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 MIcH. L. Rnv. 395 (1921) ; Notes,
30 N. C. L. REv. 67 (1951); 19 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1941); Comment, 34 YALE L. J.
316 (1924).
' Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 597, 83 S. E. 807, 809 (1914). "If they [chari-
table institutions] are permitted to employ those who are incompetent and unskilled,
funds bestowed for beneficence are diverted from their true purpose, and, under the
form of a charity, they become a menace to those for whose benefit they are estab-
lished. It is, therefore, better for those committed to their care and for the insti-
tutions, and necessary to effectuate the purpose of their creation, to require the
exercise of ordinary care in selecting employees, and in supervising them."
"Turnage v. New Bern Consistory, 215 N. C. 798, 3 S. E. 2d 8 (1939) (De-
fendant who was operating a theater and turning over the entire profits to a chari-
table organization was held liable to third party).
"Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Hospitals, 197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672 (1929).
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to select competent employees. 46 A third party collected from a theater
which gave its entire profits to a charitable institution.47 On the other
hand, a patient who had paid in part for his hospital service through
-deductions from his wages4" and the patients who had paid the regular
hospital charges were denied recovery.49
Thus the persons for whom the hospital was established and who
have paid to receive its services are the ones who are without remedy
when injured by negligence of the hospital's employees. 50 It is difficult
to see why this is sound reason. To say that the patient who pays is
merely making a contribution to charity or contracts only for carefully
selected employees is patent fiction, contrary to both fact and popular
understanding. To say that the hospital is in danger of destruction if
held liable is to ignore the character and size of the modem hospital and
the use of liability insurance as an ordinary expense of doing business.
To say that the injured individual must bear his own loss is to ignore
the trend in other fields toward distribution of risks through such means
as Workmen's Compensation or state and Federal tort claims acts.51
Perhaps, as the Court suggested in Williams v. Randolph Hospital,
Inc., a change in the rule exempting the charitable hospital from lia-
bility is a question of policy to be pondered and resolved not by the
courts but by the legislature.52  Recently legislatures in at least two
states have partially changed the rule of immunity, not directly by
making hospitals liable, but by allowing direct suit against the hospital's
insurance carrier and forbidding the carrier from setting up the hos-
pital's defense of immunity.53 The North Carolina Legislature, six
weeks after the Randolph Hospital case, apparently reconsidered its
policy as applied to state hospitals and adopted a rule of strict immunity
for state hospitals although the state remains liable for injuries caused
by other state agencies.54
Thus it would appear that North Carolina through both its courts
and its legislature has steadfastly set its face toward the nineteenth cen-
"Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914).
" Turnage v. New Bern Consistory, 215 N. C. 798, 3 S. E. 2d 8 (1939).
'" Barden v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
"See note 1 supra.
90 To say that most surgeons carry malpractice insurance is only a partial an-
swer. Many injuries are caused by employees who are clearly servants of the
hospital and who probably do not carry insurance.
" But see N. C. SEss. LAWS 1953, c. 1314 amending the 1951 State Tort Claims
Act so as to make it inapplicable to persons injured by the negligence of physicians,
nurses, and employees of state hospitals and other state medical institutions. Dis-
cussed in 31 N. C. L. RBv. 443 (1953).
92237 N. C. 387, 392, 75 S. E. 2d 303, 306 (1953).
"ARK. STAT. § 66-517 (1947), Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92
F. Supp. 140 (W. D. Ark. 1950); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 48A § 82(1951), Thomas v. Board of County Comm'rs of Prince George's County, 92 A. 2d
452 (Md. 1952).
' See note 51 supra.
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tury doctrine of immunity for charitable hospitals while an increasing
number of states turn toward a rule of liability more in keeping with
twentieth century public policy.
JEANNE OWEN
Torts-Physician and Surgeon-Liability for Acts of Assistants-
Respondeat Superior
An action for damages, involving two appeals to the North Carolina
Supreme Court,' arose out of the death of plaintiff's intestate following
an operation performed by defendant physician. At the trial stage non-
suits were entered as to defendant's hospital and nurse, and a verdict was
rendered in favor of the physician. On appeal2 the non-suits were
affirmed3 and a new trial was ordered as to the physician because of
error in the trial judge's charge to the jury.4 On retrial, a verdict was
again rendered in favor of the physician. This was reversed and another
trial ordered as to the physician,5 the court holding that the trial judge
erred when he instructed the jury that the nurse was not an "employee"
of the physician and that the physician would not be responsible for the
negligence of the nurse, thus excluding the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior from consideration.
The responsibility of a physician for the acts of his assistants has
been the subject of litigation in other courts, and the resulting decisions
make it clear that a physician may be liable in this situation (1) for his
own negligence, in causing or allowing an assistant to injure a patient,
or (2) for the assistant's negligence, which is imputed to the physician
under the principles of agency.
A physician may be personally negligent in employing, retaining or
using an incompetent assistant, as when he engages a layman to adminis-
ter chloroform.6 It is his legal -duty to see that the entire treatment of
his patient is carried on correctly, but he may properly delegate simple
tasks to his assistants, and thereby relieve himself of legal responsibility.7
'Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N. C. 259, 72 S. E. 2d 589 (1952) ; Jackson v. Mountain
Sanitarium, 234 N. C. 222, 67 S. E. 2d 57 (1951), rehearing denied, 235 N. C. 758,
69 S. E. 2d 29 (1952).2 Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium, 234 N. C. 222, 67 S. E. 2d 57 (1951).
3Id. at 225, 67 S. E. 2d at 60.
The judge instructed the jury in such a manner as to require expert testimony
to establish the physician's liability, and this was held error. The court also held
that the trial judge erred in not admitting a written report offered in evidence by
the plaintiff. Id. at 255, 67 S. E. 2d at 60.
'Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N. C. 259, 72 S. E. 2d 589 (1952).
'Nations v. Ludington Lumber Co., 133 La. 657, 63 So. 257 (1913). See,
Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F. 2d 494, 496 (D. C. Cir. 1940) ; Reynolds v. Smith, 148
Iowa 264, 269, 127 N. W. 192, 194 (1910); Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 167,
160 N. W. 173, 174 (1917).
Spears v. McKinnon, 168 Ark. 357, 270 S. W. 524 (1925) ; Funk v. Bonham,
151 N. E. 22 (Ill. Ct. App. 1926) ; Hunner v. Stevenson, 122 Md. 40, 89 Atl. 418
(1913) ; Guell v. Tenney, 262 Mass. 54, 159 N. E. 451 (1928) ; Saucier v. Ross,
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